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AT THE OUTSET, I MUST SAY that there are probably twenty peo-
ple at this symposium who are equally well suited to give this keynote.
People like Matt Parrella, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Andy Weiss-
mann, FBI General Counsel, who are using the authorities provided
in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”)1 every day to
put bad guys in jail and make us all safer. People like Stephanie Pell,
Richard Salgado, Paul Ohm, Judge Ryan, and others who, at earlier
stages in their careers, themselves used these tools to fight crime. Peo-
ple like Bryan Cunningham and others, who are daily advising compa-
nies trying to interpret this law and apply it in the context of real
requests. People like Professor Susan Freiwald and Kevin Bankston,
who have written amicus briefs in many of the recent key cases inter-
preting ECPA. And of course, Magistrate Judge Stephen Smith, who
helped spark the magistrates’ revolt and is writing the opinions that
are helping pave the way forward on defining the relationship among
ECPA, the Fourth Amendment, and new technological realities.
* James X. Dempsey is Vice President for Public Policy at the Center for Democracy
& Technology and head of CDT West. He coordinates the Digital Due Process coalition.
1. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). ECPA amended the federal
Wiretap Act, currently codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006), to extend its
rules for real-time interception to include electronic communications. Tit. I, §§ 101–110,
100 Stat. at 1848–59 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006)). ECPA also
added new chapters setting standards for access to stored communications and transac-
tional records, tit. II, § 201, 100 Stat. at 1860–68 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11 (2006)),
and for use of pen registers and trap and trace devices, which collect transactional data in
real-time, tit. III, § 301, 100 Stat. at 1868–72 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–26 (2006)).
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All of these, and others I have probably overlooked, are equally
well suited to be speaking at length about the challenges of applying
and updating ECPA in the digital age.
So where does that leave me? I think that my expertise, such as it
is, is in the legislative arena, and that is where I am going to focus.
Overall, I think there is a fascinating story here of how law reform
does or does not occur. First, I am going to provide a little historical
background on the legislative efforts to reform ECPA. Then, I will spe-
cifically discuss the Digital Due Process coalition and then I will spend
a little bit of time talking about the future. In looking to the future, I
am going to focus mainly on the non-content issues, which is where I
think the real controversy now lies, post-Warshak.2
In terms of the history, we could go all the way back to 1877 when
the Supreme Court held in Ex parte Jackson3 that letters voluntarily dis-
closed to a third party—the Post Office in that case—are protected by
the Constitution.4 That case involved the same arguments about vol-
untary surrender that we still hear today around the third-party
records doctrine.5 However, instead of tracing the story from Ex parte
Jackson to Olmstead6 to Katz7 to Smith v. Maryland,8 I will go back only to
the early 1990s and give a short timeline of what has happened since
the enactment of ECPA.
ECPA was clearly a forward-looking statute and, in drafting it,
members of Congress displayed a remarkable appreciation for the
power of the then-emerging Internet and wireless technologies. At a
2. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
3. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
4. Id. at 733.
5. Id. Briefly stated, the third-party records doctrine posits that you lose any Fourth
Amendment rights in information that you voluntarily disclose to a third party, such as the
information revealed or created in the course of a business transaction. See, e.g., Susan
Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV 3, ¶¶ 36–49;
Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009).
6. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that warrantless
tapping of telephone wires does not violate the Fourth Amendment, absent a physical inva-
sion of personal property, because “one who installs in his house a telephone instrument
with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside”).
7. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967) (along with Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967), overturning Olmstead and stating, “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected” (citations omitted)).
8. 442 U.S. 735, 741–46 (1979) (holding that the installation and use of a pen regis-
ter was not a search under the Fourth Amendment because petitioner voluntarily conveyed
phone numbers to the telephone company and thus lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy).
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time when even the people inventing and deploying the technologies
did not fully appreciate the revolution that was occurring, some mem-
bers of Congress saw the need for a legal framework that would create
the trust that could allow innovative services to become widely
accepted.
Despite the remarkable achievement of ECPA, it was not very
long before the limitations of the statute began to emerge. For exam-
ple, by the early 1990s, concerns were being raised about the richness
of the transactional data associated with Internet communications,
which the pen register standard of ECPA allowed the government to
access without any real showing of suspicion or need.9 Also, by the
early 1990s, there was growing concern about the potential of mobile
phones to serve as tracking devices.10
In 1994, when Congress adopted the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”),11 requiring telephone compa-
nies to design their networks to be wiretap friendly, it amended ECPA
to strengthen the standard for § 2703(d) orders,12 specifically to ad-
dress the richness of Internet transactional data. Also, Congress added
language to CALEA prohibiting the government from obtaining loca-
tion data from a cell phone solely with the authority of a pen register
trap and trace device.13 (Congress did not say what the standard for
location data was. It merely said what the standard was not, i.e., that it
could not be a pen register standard.) However, in 1994, CALEA did
not address at all the other limits in ECPA that were growing in signifi-
9. E.g., Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement Access to Advanced Telecommunications
Technologies and Services: Joint Hearings on H.R. 4922 and S. 2375 Before the Subcomm. on Tech.
and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 6, 158, 160–61, 166–78 (1994) [hereinafter Joint
Hearings: Law Enforcement Access to Telecommunications Technology], available at http://ia700
400.us.archive.org/23/items/digitaltelephony00wash/digitaltelephony00wash.pdf (state-
ment of Jerry Berman, including memorandum of the Electronic Frontier Foundation).
10. Id.
11. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103–414, 108
Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–10 (2006)).
12. In its original incarnation, the ECPA standard for a court order for disclosure of
transactional data and certain content required only a showing of “reason to believe the
. . . information sought, [was] relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.” Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–508, tit. II, §201(a), 100 Stat. 1848,
1861 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (1988)). Currently, post-CALEA, the government
must present specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the information sought is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investi-
gation. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006).
13. § 103, 108 Stat. at 4281 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B)
(2006)).
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cance, such as the 180-day rule for stored e-mail,14 which even then no
longer made sense given the way services were evolving.
In 1998, Senator John Ashcroft introduced the first significant
ECPA reform bill, the E-Privacy Act,15 cosponsored by the author of
ECPA, Senator Patrick Leahy, and by a number of Republican sena-
tors, including current Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas. The
Ashcroft bill would have required a court order based on probable
cause for cell phone tracking,16 a warrant for accessing content from a
service provider (or a subpoena served on the subscriber to compel
him to disclose his communications),17 and true judicial review of
both pen register and trap and trace applications, requiring the judge
to make a finding of relevance.18 The bill did not move, however, and
expired at the end of the congressional session.19
In 1999, Senator Leahy reintroduced a nearly identical bill.20
Then, in September of 2000, the Republican-controlled House Judici-
ary Committee, by a vote of twenty to one, reported legislation that
would have required probable cause for access to cell phone location
information21 and, for pen-traps, a judicial finding of specific and ar-
ticulable facts giving reason to believe the information sought was rel-
evant to an ongoing investigation.22 The bill also would have extended
the 180-day rule to one year.23 Remarkably, it also would have ex-
tended the statutory suppression rule in Title III (a rule that currently
applies to interceptions only, and only wire and oral, but not elec-
tronic, communications)24 to all electronic communications,25 and to
stored, as well as real time, access.26
14. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b) (stating that the government can use a subpoena to com-
pel a service provider to disclose e-mail that has been in electronic storage for more than
180 days).
15. Encryption Protects the Rights of Individuals from Violation and Abuse in Cyber-
space (E-PRIVACY) Act, S. 2067, 105th Cong. (1998).
16. Id. § 104(a).
17. Id. § 103.
18. Id. § 105.
19. See Overview: S. 2067 (105th): Encryption Protects the Rights of Individuals from Violation
and Abuse in Cyberspace (E-PRIVACY) Act, 105th Cong., GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.
us/congress/bills/105/s2067#overview (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
20. The Electronic Rights for the 21st Century Act, S. 854, 106th Cong. (1999).
21. H.R. 5018, 106th Cong. § 7(h)(1) (2000); H.R. REP. NO. 106–932, at 17 (2000).
22. H.R. REP. NO. 106–932, at 15.
23. H.R. 5018 § 12.
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006).
25. Id. § 2.
26. H.R. 5018 § 2(a)(2).
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That was and remains a high-water mark of ECPA reform legisla-
tion. The year 2000 was an election year. By the time the Judiciary
Committee filed its report on the legislation, it was October, and the
ECPA reform legislation died. In January 2001, a new administration
took office, and then, of course, the attacks of September 11th, 2001
occurred. At that point, rational discussion of these issues became
impossible.
In the Patriot Act,27 in my view, there were expansions of govern-
ment power that made sense. It was appropriate, for example, for
Congress to establish authority for roving taps in intelligence investi-
gations.28 After all, ECPA had authorized roving taps on the law en-
forcement side in 1986.29 Similarly, it was appropriate to tear down
the wall that had separated law enforcement and intelligence. The
wall had become totally perverted and was not serving either civil lib-
erties or national security interests.
However, in my view, when addressing these legitimate concerns,
and removing some of the unjustified constraints on the government
that were inhibiting our ability to prevent future terrorist attacks, Con-
gress should also have looked at the other side of the ledger. It should
have taken up some of the ECPA reforms that the House Judiciary
Committee had approved only a year earlier, so as to counterbalance
the expansions of government power with the enhanced protections
that it also acknowledged were needed. However, in October 2001,
pleas for such balance were drowned out and, in subsequent years,
ECPA reform disappeared from the legislative agenda.
In precincts less susceptible to the fear that dominated our politi-
cal discourse after 9/11, ECPA reform was not totally forgotten. In
2003, George Washington University held a symposium entitled “The
Future of Internet Surveillance Law,” which produced a number of
articles, including Orin Kerr’s A User’s Guide to the Stored Communica-
tions Act and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It,30 Deirdre Mulligan’s
27. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107–56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
28. § 206, 115 Stat. at 282.
29. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–508, tit. I,
§106(d), 100 Stat. 1848, 1856–57 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)).
30. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act and a Legislator’s Guide
to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208–09 (2004) (explaining the basic structure
and text of the Stored Communications Act, which was enacted as a part of ECPA, and
suggesting four categories of potential reforms including bolstering privacy protections,
simplifying the statute, repealing provisions that have caused more harm than good, and
restructuring the remedies scheme for violations).
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article, A Critical Perspective on ECPA,31 and Patricia Bellia’s article, Sur-
veillance Law through Cyberlaw’s Lens,32 all of which had basically the
same premise: that ECPA, in various ways, was outdated and needed to
be amended.
Despite the widespread recognition that ECPA was outdated,
throughout the first decade of the new millennium there was no con-
gressional interest in ECPA reform. Instead, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (“FISA”)33 dominated the agenda. In December of
2005, The New York Times broke the story about the National Security
Agency’s warrantless wiretapping program,34 which led to a three-year
battle that resulted ultimately in amending FISA to ratify and some-
what expand what the administration had been doing in the warrant-
less program.35
In the absence of congressional attention, but driven by ongoing,
dramatic changes in the technology and the way people were using it,
the action shifted to the courts. In 2003, in Theofel v. Farey-Jones,36 the
Ninth Circuit rejected the Justice Department’s distinction between
opened and unopened e-mail.37 In June 2004, the First Circuit issued
its Councilman decision,38 in which the three-judge panel misinter-
preted a key definition under the statute.39 Both privacy advocates
and the Justice Department agreed that the judges had gotten it
31. Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical
Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1559
(2004) (concluding that ECPA “has failed to keep pace with changes in and on the In-
ternet and therefore no longer provides appropriate privacy protections”).
32. Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1375, 1458 (2004) (“[I]n 1986, when Congress sought largely to align treatment of elec-
tronic communications with treatment of wire communications, it could not have antici-
pated that technological developments would place so many electronic communications in
the hands of third parties.”).
33. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified as amended in 50 U.S.C. 1801–1871 (2006)) (defining rules for the collection of
foreign intelligence information by electronic surveillance and other means).
34. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
35. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.
L. 110–261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
36. 341 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), reh’g denied and opinion superseded, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th
Cir. 2004).
37. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that “prior
access is irrelevant to whether the messages at issue were in electronic storage”).
38. United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004).
39. The panel held that an electronic communication that is in electronic storage,
however temporary, is not covered by the Wiretap Act. Id. at 203–04.
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wrong,40 and an en banc decision41 mitigated most of the confusion.42
That case proved most significant for illustrating how hard it was for
judges to interpret and apply the Act’s non-intuitive categories.
Then, in August of 2005, Magistrate Judge James Orenstein in
New York ruled that the government needed a warrant to track a cell
phone in real time,43 rejecting the so-called “hybrid theory” developed
by the Justice Department to work its way around CALEA’s prohibi-
tion on the use of a pen register to acquire location information.44 A
month or so later, Magistrate Judge Smith in Texas ruled the same,45
and the magistrates’ revolt was underway. As of today, we have had at
least thirty magistrates’ opinions going in both directions on the ques-
tion of what is the standard for location information. All grappling
with the fact that it is not clear under ECPA what that standard is.46
In July of 2006, a district court in Ohio enjoined the government
from using an order under § 2703(d) to obtain stored e-mail.47 That
ruling ultimately led to the Sixth Circuit’s December 2010 decision in
40. See Petition of the United States for Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc at 1,
United States v. Councilman, 385 F.3d 793 (1st Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1383); Brief for Center
for Democracy & Technology, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Privacy Informa-
tion Center, & American Library Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant’s Peti-
tion for Rehearing & Rehearing En Banc at 2, United States v. Councilman, 385 F.3d 793
(1st Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1383).
41. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
42. Id. at 79–80 (concluding that the term “electronic communication” includes tran-
sient electronic storage that is intrinsic to the communication process for such
communication).
43. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Regis-
ter & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or Cell Site
Info., 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding “the information the government
seeks . . . is not information [it] may lawfully obtain absent a showing of probable cause”).
44. Id. at 565. Under the hybrid theory, the Department of Justice claims that it can
acquire real-time location information using the combined authority of a pen register or-
der and an order issued under § 2703(d). See, e.g., In re Application for Pen Register &
Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth. (“In re Application for Cell Site Location
Auth.”), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 761 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
45. In re Application for Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (“The govern-
ment’s hybrid theory, while undeniably creative, amounts to little more than a retrospec-
tive assemblage of disparate statutory parts to achieve a desired result.”).
46. For a description of the courts’ conflicting responses to the government’s argu-
ments and a compilation of decisions through June 1, 2010, see ECPA Reform and the Revolu-
tion in Location Based Technologies and Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 83–85, 93 (2010)
[hereinafter Hearing: Revolution in Location Based Technologies] (statement of Magistrate
Judge Stephen Wm. Smith).
47. Warshak v. United States, No. 1:06-cv-357, 2006 WL 5230332, at *8 (S.D. Ohio July
21, 2006).
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United States v. Warshak,48 which held ECPA unconstitutional to the
extent that it allows access to stored e-mail with less than a warrant.49
Also in 2006, a district court in California decided a civil case,
Quon v. Arch Wireless,50 which held that there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in stored text messages51—a ruling that was upheld by
the Ninth Circuit,52 and which was left untouched by the Supreme
Court when it considered the case under the name of City of Ontario v.
Quon.53
With these cases, we may be seeing a shift in the attitude of the
judiciary, away from merely complaining about how hard it is to inter-
pret ECPA—a theme that pervaded the earlier cases—towards a rec-
ognition that the statute’s rules, whatever they are, are inadequate as a
constitutional matter, requiring courts to hold that a warrant is re-
quired in circumstances where the statute did not require one.
While the courts were grappling with ECPA’s limitations, I began
perceiving a shift in the attitude of the communications and Internet
companies that are on the receiving end of government requests. As
Al Gidari said in his famous remarks, these companies are caught in
the middle between their recognition of the legitimate needs of the
government, their desire to respect the privacy of their customers, and
their business interest in providing a trusted service.54 These compa-
nies want to cooperate with and recognize the legitimate interests of
the government, but they also want to be able to provide better,
clearer assurances of privacy to their customers.
The Center for Democracy and Technology (“CDT”) coordinates
the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group (“DPSWG”), a forum
for companies, trade associations, and public interest groups from
across the political spectrum. DPSWG actually predates CDT, having
been established at the ACLU by Jerry Berman. Jerry moved manage-
ment of DPSWG to the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) when
he headed the EFF office in Washington for a while, then brought it
48. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
49. Id. at 288 (“[T]o the extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to
obtain . . . emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional.”).
50. 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
51. Id. at 1140–43.
52. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 903–08 (9th Cir. 2008).
53. 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 (2010) (avoiding the constitutional question of whether
there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy in stored text messages, on prudential
grounds).
54. Albert Gidari, Jr., Companies Caught in the Middle, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 535, 558 (2007).
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with him in 1994 when he founded CDT.55 CDT has managed
DPSWG ever since. DPSWG served as a focus for the dialogue that led
to the enactment of ECPA in 1986.56 It also served as a forum for
discussion and consensus building around the encryption debates of
the 1990s.57
So when I began to sense around 2005 or 2006 that communica-
tions and Internet companies were becoming increasingly uncomfort-
able with the application of ECPA and with the disconnect between
what they perceived their customers expected and what the statute
allowed, DPSWG was the best forum in which to begin a dialogue
around updating ECPA.
Convening DPSWG, CDT chaired a series of discussions through
2007, 2008, and 2009. First, we met every two to four months, explor-
ing the issues. We started with a list of over a dozen issues. Gradually
we pared these down and built consensus around a set of incremental
reforms. As concerns coalesced, the pace of our meetings picked up.
We began to meet face-to-face and by conference call on a monthly,
and then ultimately a weekly basis,58 bringing together companies,
public interest groups, and other experts. Among others playing key
roles were former prosecutors,59 such as Richard Salgado and Mark
Zwillinger, who brought to the discussion their practical experience
about the government’s needs.
During this process, several key points emerged that I believe are
critical to the success of ECPA reform. First of all, it is critical to have
the participation and support of the companies that are developing
55. See Joint Hearings: Law Enforcement Access to Telecommunications Technology, supra note
9, at 65–67; Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Hearings on H.R. 3378 before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong. 469 (1985) [hereinafter House ECPA Hearings], available at http://www.justice.gov/
jmd/ls/legislative_histories/pl99-508/hear-50-1985.pdf (memorandum summarizing a
consultation convened by what later became DPSWG regarding the privacy issues posed by
electronic mail).
56. See Electronic Communication Privacy: Hearing on S. 1667 Before the Subcomm. on Pat-
ents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 124–25 (1985)
[hereinafter Senate ECPA Hearing], available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/legislative_
histories/pl99-508/hear-j-99-72-1985.pdf (statement of Jerry Berman describing industry-
privacy consultations on electronic communications privacy).
57. See ELEC. SURVEILLANCE TASK FORCE OF THE DIGITAL PRIVACY & SEC. WORKING GRP.,
INTERIM REPORT: COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 23–26 (1997), available at
https://www.cdt.org/wiretap/9706rpt.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
58. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
stitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5 (2010)
[hereinafter Hearing: Privacy Act Reform] (statement of James X. Dempsey), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-98_56271.PDF.
59. Id.
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innovative technologies and offering the communications services
that have become so central to our daily lives. Particularly post-9/11,
civil liberties interests have to be combined with the interests of the
corporate sector in innovation, certainty, clarity, and customer trust as
essential components of the business model. Indeed, it was industry
and civil liberties groups working together that promoted passage of
ECPA in the first place.60 Key corporate supporters in 1986 included
AT&T and IBM.61 It is crucial that they be actively engaged today as
well.
Second, ECPA reform must be bi-partisan. It must not be pige-
onholed according to the left-right, liberal-versus-conservative dynam-
ics that infect so many policy debates. The Fourth Amendment is just
as dear to conservatives and libertarians as it is to liberals. Limits on
government power are at the core of the conservative and libertarian
philosophies. I am very proud that the ECPA reform effort includes
Americans for Tax Reform, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and
other leading conservative and libertarian voices.62
Third, ECPA reform must preserve the building blocks of the in-
vestigative process: the subpoena for subscriber identifying informa-
tion and other basic information, the court order issued under
§ 2703(d) on less than probable cause for Internet transactional infor-
mation, and the warrant for communications content and other
highly sensitive information. It is important that investigators have the
ability to work their way up that ladder of authority, gaining access to
more sensitive data as the standard increases.
Fourth, ECPA reform does not have to take on the whole third-
party doctrine. The concurring opinions in Jones may prompt a recon-
sideration of the third-party doctrine,63 but ECPA reform need focus
only on communications data and communications service providers.
60. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5–6 (1986) (listing corporate supporters of the legislation);
H. REP. NO. 99-647, at 29–30 (1986) (same).
61. House ECPA Hearings, supra note 55, at 108–10 (transcript of AT&T testimony in
support of the Act); Senate ECPA Hearing, supra note 56, at 155 (listing ECPA’s supporters,
including corporate sponsors AT&T and IBM).
62. See Who We Are, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?
objectid=DF652CE0-2552-11DF-B455000C296BA163 (last visited Nov. 9, 2012) (alphabeti-
cally listing all Digital Due Process coalition members).
63. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954–57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring) (finding that even short term GPS monitoring violates society’s reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy and suggesting that, in the digital age, “it may be necessary to reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information volun-
tarily disclosed to third parties”); id. at 957–64 (Alito, J., concurring) (finding that the
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Fifth, it is best to leave in place the parallel system of authorities
that exist for national security investigations and not to try to harmo-
nize standards under ECPA with those under FISA. FISA is probably
more confusing and less coherent than ECPA, but rational debate
over FISA standards is impossible given the fear of terrorism and the
secrecy that surrounds the interpretation and application of FISA.
Sixth, in reforming ECPA, it is not necessary to change—and may
be best to leave unchanged—the rules surrounding the use of subpoe-
nas served on individuals or corporations that demand disclosure of
the communications or other records created by and pertaining to
those individuals or corporations. Traditionally, when the government
seeks records from a corporation, it serves a subpoena on the corpora-
tion itself, compelling the corporation to turn over all responsive
records, including copies of communications to or from the corpora-
tion that are stored by or accessible to the corporation.64 Even though
such a subpoena is not based on probable cause, it is “reasonable” as a
matter of Fourth Amendment law, provided it satisfies certain require-
ments.65 The recipient of the subpoena can resist it on the grounds
that it is overbroad or burdensome.66 ECPA reform will not require
the government to obtain a warrant in order to compel a corporation
to disclose its own communications (as both sender and recipient). In
the case of individuals, the Fourth Amendment allows the government
to use a subpoena to demand that the individual turn over relevant
records that are in the individual’s possession or otherwise available to
long-term surveillance of defendant’s movements, enabled by modern technology, violated
society’s reasonable expectation of privacy).
64. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GRAND JURY MANUAL § III.A.2(c) (1991) (“Subpoe-
nas duces tecum may be served on any natural person, legal entity, or corporation. . . .
Documents or other tangible items may be obtained by subpoena duces tecum from any
person who is either in physical or constructive possession or control of them.”). The same
rule applies to civil investigations, where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specify that a
subpoena extends to electronically stored information in a person’s “possession, custody,
or control.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). Control under this rule has been construed “as
the legal right, authority or practical ability to obtain the materials sought upon demand.”
SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 194 F.R.D. 469, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (emphasis added). See
also SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 3.2.6.2 (2012)
(“The subpoenaed entity or individual is required to produce all subpoenaed items that
are in its possession, custody or control. This includes items under the subpoenaed entity
or individual’s control or custody, but that are not in its immediate possession.”).
65. Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208–09 (1946).
66. Id.; see also Joshua Gruenspecht, “Reasonable” Grand Jury Subpoenas: Asking for Infor-
mation in the Age of Big Data, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 543, 545–47 (2011) (noting that the
reasonableness of a subpoena turns on its “relevance, particularity, and . . . temporal
scope”).
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him,67 but the Fifth Amendment may limit the ability of the govern-
ment to compel an individual to disclose any such records.68 The Fifth
Amendment does not protect corporations in this context.69 ECPA re-
form need not affect current practice under these rules; ECPA reform
instead is focused on compelled disclosure from service providers. To
the extent that the Constitution allows use of subpoenas to require a
party to disclose its own communications, that rule would remain un-
affected by ECPA reform.
Guided by these principles, and after some remarkable meetings
that built trust among the participants, a DPSWG spin-off coalition
calling itself Digital Due Process (“DDP”) was launched in March
2010.70 At the time, the coalition consisted of nine companies and
twelve trade associations, think tanks, and advocacy groups.71 As of
March 2012, the coalition has tripled in size, growing to twenty-seven
companies and thirty-one associations and groups.72
The goal of DDP is to “simplify, clarify, and unify the ECPA stan-
dards, providing stronger privacy protections for communications and
associated data in response to changes in technology and new services
and usage patterns, while preserving the legal tools necessary for gov-
ernment agencies to enforce the laws, respond to emergency circum-
stances and protect the public.”73 Within this framework, DDP
adopted four principles. First,
A governmental entity may require an entity covered by ECPA (a
provider of wire or electronic communication service or a provider
of remote computing service) to disclose communications that are
67. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Rich & Co. v. United States), 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d
Cir. 1983) (“The test for the production of documents is control, not location.”); Schwim-
mer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 1956) (“The law recognizes no distinction
between constructive possession, with control, and physical possession, as a basis for a sub-
poena to compel production . . . .”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii) (a subpoena
commands the person to whom it is directed to produce documents in that person’s pos-
session, custody, or control); Cooper Indus. v. British Aerospace, 102 F.R.D. 918, 919
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (to be subject to subpoena “[d]ocuments need not be in the possession of
a party to be discoverable, they need only be in its custody or control.”). For a general
discussion of the position of subpoenas under the Fourth Amendment, see In re Subpoena
Duces Tecum (United States v. Bailey), 228 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2000).
68. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43–46 (2000).
69. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104–05 (1988).
70. Miguel Helft, A Wide Call to Improve Web Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at B1.
71. Press Release, Digital Due Process, Advocacy Groups, Companies Call for an Up-
date of the Privacy Framework for Law Enforcement Access to Digital Info. (Mar. 30,
2010), available at http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=3CD858A0-ABFA-11
E0-817A000C296BA163.
72. See Who We Are, supra note 62 (alphabetically listing members of DDP).
73. Id.
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not readily accessible to the public only with a search warrant is-
sued based on a showing of probable cause, regardless of the age of
the communications, the means or status of their storage or the
provider’s access to or use of the communications in its normal
business operations.74
This reform would mean that the government, except in emer-
gency circumstances or pursuant to one of ECPA’s other exceptions,
would need a warrant to compel a service provider to disclose stored
communications content—whether opened or unopened and
whether more than 180 days old or not. Basically, this change would
eliminate for this purpose the significance of the difference between
an electronic communication service (“ECS”)75 and a remote comput-
ing service (“RCS”).76 As an e-mail moved from ECS to RCS status, its
legal protection would not change. All e-mail—messages in the spam
folder, the read messages, the unread messages—regardless of age,
would be covered by the same standard.
The second principle adopted by DDP states, “[a] governmental
entity may access, or may require a covered entity to provide, prospec-
tively or retrospectively, location information regarding a mobile com-
munications device only with a warrant issued based on a showing of
probable cause.”77 This reform would establish the probable cause
standard for location tracking information, including information
identifying cell towers, which is becoming increasingly more detailed
and revealing.
The third adopted principle says,
A governmental entity may access, or may require a covered entity
to provide, prospectively or in real time, dialed number informa-
tion, email to and from information or other data currently cov-
ered by the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices
only after judicial review and a court finding that the governmental
entity has made a showing at least as strong as the showing under
2703(d).78
This principle would reform the pen-trap statute, which currently
says that the court, whenever presented with an application by the
74. Our Principles, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?ob-
jectid=99629E40-2551-11DF-8E02000C296BA163 (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).
75. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006) (defining
“electronic communication service” as “any service which provides to users thereof the
ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications”).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (defining “remote computing service” as “the provision to the
public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communica-
tions system”).
77. See Our Principles, supra note 74.
78. Id.
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government, “shall” issue the order if it finds that the government has
said that the information sought is relevant to an ongoing investiga-
tion.79 Ironically, current law states that when the government seeks
Internet transactional data from storage, it must obtain a court order
under § 2703(d) based on a showing of “specific and articulable
facts.”80 The proposed reform would establish the § 2703(d) standard
as the uniform rule for both real-time interception and access to
stored transactional data.
Fourth and finally, “[w]here the Stored Communications Act au-
thorizes a subpoena to acquire information, a governmental entity
may use such subpoenas only for information related to a specified
account(s) or individual(s). All non-particularized requests must be
subject to judicial approval.”81 This principle would prevent the gov-
ernment from using subpoenas for bulk disclosure of transactional
data. It responds to cases, such as the Indymedia investigation, where
the government has tried to use a subpoena to obtain all of the infor-
mation on all of the subscribers who have accessed a certain page or
certain content.82 Under the DDP proposal, such bulk information
would not be available without a warrant under the § 2703(d)
standard.
In response to the launch of DDP’s recommendations, the Judici-
ary Committees of both the House and the Senate held hearings on
ECPA reform. The House Committee held three hearings starting in
May 2010.83 The Senate Committee held a hearing in September of
the same year.84 In May of 2011, Senator Leahy, chairman of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee and the original author of ECPA, introduced
79. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (2006).
80. Id. § 2703(d).
81. See Our Principles, supra note 74.
82. See How the Government Secretly Demanded the IP Address of Every Visitor to Political News
Site Indymedia.us, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Nov. 9, 2009), https://www.eff.org/
wp/eff-s-secret-files-anatomy-bogus-subpoena; Declan McCullagh, Justice Dept. Asked for News
Site’s Visitor Lists, CNET (Nov. 10, 2009, 9:10 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10
394026-38.html.
83. Hearing: Privacy Act Reform, supra note 58; ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud
Computing, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hear-
ings/printers/111th/111-149_58409.PDF; Hearing: Revolution in Location Based Technologies,
supra note 46.
84. See The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and Protecting Privacy
in the Digital Age, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg66875/pdf/CHRG-111shrg66875.pdf.
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ECPA reform legislation,85 adopting several of the recommendations
of our coalition, notably a warrant for access to content86 and a war-
rant for real time tracking of location information.87
The following month, in June 2011, Senator Ron Wyden in the
Senate, and Representatives Jason Chaffetz and Bob Goodlatte in the
House, introduced the Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act88
(“GPS Act”), requiring a warrant for access to both real time and
stored location information.89 In October 2011, on the twenty-fifth an-
niversary of the enactment of ECPA, Republican Senator Kirk cospon-
sored the Wyden legislation.90 On November 29, 2012, the Senate
Judiciary Committee reported legislation that would have amended
ECPA to require a warrant for the government to compel a service
provider to disclose the content of communications.91 The legislation
expired at the end of the congressional session without further action,
but the bi-partisan vote signaled the start of a new phase in ECPA
reform.
Meanwhile, the pace of the judicial process has accelerated, with
some dramatic results. In August 2010, the D.C. Circuit held that the
planting of a GPS device was a search requiring a warrant.92 In Sep-
tember 2010, the Third Circuit ruled that magistrates could require
the government to obtain a warrant in order to compel a service pro-
vider to disclose stored cell site information.93 In December of the
same year, the Sixth Circuit ruled in the Warshak case that stored e-
mail was constitutionally protected and that ECPA was unconstitu-
tional to the extent that it allowed access to e-mail content without a
85. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th
Cong. (2011).
86. Id. § 3.
87. Id. § 5.
88. See Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, S. 1212, 112th Cong. (2011); Ge-
olocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, H.R. 2168, 112th Cong. (2011).
89. See S. 1212 § 2602(h); H.R. 2168 § 2602(h).
90. Press Release, Mark Kirk, U.S. Sen. for Illinois, Kirk Joins Wyden as Cosponser of
Digital Surveillance Legislation (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.kirk.senate.gov/?p
=press_release&id=337.
91. Press Release, Patrick Leahy, U.S. Sen. for Vermont, Senate Judiciary Committee
Approves Leahy-Authored Legislation to Update Video Privacy Protection Act, Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (Nov. 29, 2012), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/
press/senate-judiciary-committee-approves-leahy-authored-legislation-to-update-video-pri-
vacy-protection-act-electronic-communications-privacy-act.
92. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
93. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv.
to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010).
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warrant.94 And then, of course, most remarkably, in January 2012, the
Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Jones case, holding
that the government’s installation and use of a GPS device to track a
person for twenty-eight days was a search under the Fourth
Amendment.95
Looking to the future, I think the debate on e-mail is essentially
over. The Sixth Circuit requires a warrant.96 The Ninth Circuit would
almost certainly hold the same, based on its finding in the Quon case
that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in stored texts.97 The
leading providers of cloud-based e-mail services have said that they
insist on a warrant for disclosure of content98 and, in practice, the
government seems to be using a warrant in most cases. Perhaps the
government is getting stored content without a warrant in some cases
in some jurisdictions, but I think it is unlikely that the government
would ever seek a straight ruling that there is no expectation of pri-
vacy in stored e-mail. Instead, it is more likely to try to cite specific
terms of service as eliminating the reasonable expectation of privacy
for that particular service. For reasons beyond our scope here, I be-
lieve that effort should fail in most if not all cases.99
94. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).
95. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
96. See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288.
97. See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904–08 (9th Cir. 2008).
98. Dropbox Law Enforcement Handbook, DROPBOX, https://dl.dropbox.com/s/77fr4t57t
9g8tbo/law_enforcement_handbook.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2013) (“Dropbox will not
provide user content, whether in files or otherwise, without a search warrant (or an
equivalent legal obligation) that requires the content to be disclosed.”); Information for Law
Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guide
lines/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2013) (“A search warrant issued under the procedures described
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent state warrant procedures upon a
showing of probable cause is required to compel the disclosure of the stored contents of
any account, which may include messages, photos, videos, wall posts, and location informa-
tion.”); Guidelines for Law Enforcement, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/groups/33-re-
port-a-violation/topics/148-policy-information/articles/41949-guidelines-for-law-enforce
ment#section5 (last visited Jan. 14, 2013) (“[R]equests for contents of communication re-
quire a U.S. search warrant”); see Chris Soghoian, Google’s Pro-Privacy Legal Position Re: DOJ
Could Assist Class Action Lawyers in Search Referrer Privacy Lawsuit, SLIGHT PARANOIA, (Apr. 4,
2012) http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2012/04/googles-pro-privacy-legal-position-re.html
(quoting remarks by Richard Salgado at this symposium stating that “Google and I think a
lot of providers are taking this position, [seeing] the 4th amendment particularly as it has
been applied in the Warshak cases, as establishing that there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy such that disclosure of the contents held with the third party is protected by the 4th
Amendment. And not limited to email, but other material that is uploaded to the service
provider to be handled by the service provider.”).
99. See Jim X. Dempsey, Privacy Policies Don’t Trump Expectation of Privacy, CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Apr. 21, 2011), https://www.cdt.org/blogs/jim-dempsey/privacy-pol-
icies-dont-trump-expectation-privacy.
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Despite what seems to be a clear trend suggesting that privacy
advocates have already won on the standard for stored communica-
tions, I—being a little bit of a legislative purist—think it would still be
useful to correct the statute. Not only has a major statute protecting
the privacy rights of Americans now been held unconstitutional in
part, but, as a major investigative tool for law enforcement agencies at
the state and federal level, it deserves to be made consistent with the
Constitution. To some degree, I understand the Justice Department’s
willingness to continue operating under an unconstitutional statute.
Regardless, I think it would be logical to eliminate the unconstitu-
tional language from ECPA, which can be easily done.
The real battle now is over transactional data. In this regard, Jones
is momentous. In that case, not a single member of the Supreme
Court accepted the Justice Department’s argument that a person has
zero privacy interest in information voluntarily disclosed to a third
party (in that case, one’s location on the public street). In other
words, not a single Justice in Jones was swayed by the vision of privacy
that underpins the third-party doctrine.
In retrospect, after reading Jones, it is remarkable how much
scope the lower courts accorded the third-party doctrine in the years
since it was first laid down. First of all, as Professor Freiwald has ex-
plained in her articles, when you actually read Smith v. Maryland, you
see how narrow that opinion was.100 The Supreme Court noted there
that pen-trap information does not reveal whether the call was com-
pleted or not.101 Today, in contrast, transactional data collected by a
pen-trap can reveal the websites you visit, what port number is being
used (which can indicate the application or process that is being
used), the time, date and duration of each communication, the size of
each communication, the existence and size of any attachments to an
e-mail, the IP addresses and “to” and “from” addresses of the parties
100. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Ques-
tion of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 733 (2011) (“Finally, far from establishing a broad
‘non-contents’ rule, Smith covered only the telephone numbers the target dialed and lim-
ited its reasoning to that data.”); Susan Freiwald & Patricia L. Bellia, Fourth Amendment
Protection for Stored E-Mail, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 163 (2008) (“Smith did not address the
vastly richer information available about modern communications, such as the identities of
the parties, the duration of their communications, and all of the information associated
with web-based communications and use.”).
101. Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1979) (quoting United States v. N.Y.
Tel. Co., 434 US. 159, 167 (1977)).
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on both ends of the communication, and approximate physical loca-
tion, among other details.102
Moreover, looking back over the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
in light of Jones, one finds other indications that the Supreme Court
has never held as narrow a view of privacy as the lower courts. Instead,
as Stephen Henderson wrote last year,103 the Supreme Court has in
fact rejected in several cases the argument that a voluntary disclosure
wipes out all privacy interests against the government. For example,
Bond v. United States104 was the Supreme Court case in which a majority
held that it was a search under the Fourth Amendment for the police
to squeeze a person’s bag in the overhead rack on a bus.105 The dis-
sent explicitly cited Smith v. Maryland for the proposition that there is
no privacy interest in your luggage on the bus because, the dissent
said, you have knowingly exposed it to the public.106 In Kyllo v. United
States,107 the government essentially argued that the heat coming from
your house was something that you not only exposed to the public,
but also discarded as waste.108 Yet, the Court found in Kyllo that moni-
toring the heat radiating from the house was a search.109
I recently looked again at a 1989 case that seems very relevant
now: United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press.110 It is a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) case. A re-
porter was seeking criminal records from the FBI rap sheet database
102. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 2008) (pen register col-
lected IP addresses of websites visited and to/from information on e-mails); U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTI-
GATIONS 227–32 (2009) (sample pen-trap application specifying that surveillance is ex-
pected to acquire e-mail address information identifying the parties to each
communication, the date, time, and duration of each message, the size of each message,
and the number and size of any attachments); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE ELECTRONIC SURVEIL-
LANCE MANUAL 39 (2005) (explaining that pen registers can collect IP addresses, port num-
bers, and e-mail “to” and “from” information); Thomas Lowenthal, IP Address Can Now Pin
Down Your Location to Within a Half Mile, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 22, 2011), http://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/2011/04/getting-warmer-an-ip-address-can-map-you-within-half-a-mile/.
103. Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doc-
trine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 41–43 (2011).
104. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
105. Id. at 339.
106. Id. at 341–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
108. Id. at 35 (“The Government maintains . . . that the thermal imaging must be up-
held because it detected ‘only heat radiating from the external surface of the house.’”
(quoting Brief for the United States at 26, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No.
99-8508), 2000 WL 1890949, at *26)).
109. Id. at 40.
110. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
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about a man named Charles Medico, who was suspected of having ties
to organized crime. The FBI denied the request under FOIA’s privacy
exemption.111 The reporter argued that privacy could not be invoked
to deny his request because all arrest records are public.112 If they are
available one by one on the blotter sheets at police stations and in the
records of the courts, the reporter argued, then they cannot become
private when compiled into one comprehensive record at the FBI.113
The Supreme Court rejected the reporter’s claim and upheld the
government’s argument that there is in fact a privacy interest in the
compiled records.114 The Court’s language is essentially a rejection of
the rationale behind the third-party records doctrine:
Because events summarized in a rap sheet have been previously
disclosed to the public, respondents contend that Medico’s privacy
interest in avoiding disclosure of a federal compilation of these
events approaches zero. We reject respondents’ cramped notion of
personal privacy.
To begin with, both the common law and the literal understand-
ings of privacy encompass the individual’s control of information
concerning his or her person. In an organized society, there are
few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another.
Thus the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at com-
mon law rested in part on the degree of dissemination of the alleg-
edly private fact and the extent to which the passage of time
rendered it private. According to Webster’s initial definition, infor-
mation may be classified as “private” if it is “intended for or re-
stricted to the use of a particular person or group or class of
persons: not freely available to the public.” Recognition of this at-
tribute of a privacy interest supports the distinction, in terms of
personal privacy, between scattered disclosure of the bits of infor-
mation contained in a rap sheet and revelation of the rap sheet as a
whole.115
There it was, a total refutation of the theory that if you give infor-
mation to one party for one purpose, you’ve lost all control over it for
any other purpose. Stevens wrote the opinion, which Justices Rehn-
quist, White, Marshall, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy all joined.
Blackmun and Brennan concurred.116
So all the time that the lower courts were broadly applying the
third-party doctrine and assuming that the privacy interest in a partic-
111. Id. at 757.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 762–71.
115. Id. at 762–64 (citations omitted).
116. U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 750 (1989).
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ular piece of information was a binary right that could be lost with a
single disclosure to a third party, there was actually a fundamentally
different vision of privacy at the Supreme Court, one that was more
consistent with the information-based society we live in. Then Jones
reached the Court, and not a single Justice agreed with the govern-
ment’s claim that there is no privacy interest in information volunta-
rily disclosed to another.
Personally, what’s interesting about this is that in the dialogue
leading up to the creation of the DDP coalition, I was the one arguing
against taking on the third-party records doctrine. I assumed the doc-
trine was unassailable. I argued that we should accord transactional
data a higher degree of protection only one category at a time, based
on the category’s unique sensitivity. Following that approach, DDP in
effect identified only one category of data entitled to higher protec-
tion: location data. In the future, I assumed, there might develop con-
sensus that other categories of data also deserved higher protection,
as their significance became apparent.
However, the Justice Department, by resisting legislative reform,
and by going all in on the third-party doctrine in Jones, has ended up
with a decision that fundamentally questions the third-party doc-
trine—at the very least, for large quantities of transactional data that
reveal a person’s activities or associations. Suddenly, five Justices seem
open to the “mosaic theory,” which posits that disparate items of data,
each relatively insignificant on its own, become more sensitive as they
are compiled in larger quantities to create a picture of a person’s
life.117
Over the coming years, the courts are going to zig and zag over
the meaning of the Jones decision, but to me Jones shows just how mod-
est the DDP proposals are. I see Jones as opening up a new era of
Fourth Amendment law, in particular, requiring us to go back and
look again at the third-party record doctrine. In the meantime, while
we explore the implications of Jones, I will continue to urge the Justice
Department to come to the table and correct the unconstitutionality
of ECPA. I urge companies who are not yet members of DDP to join
this effort. After Jones, it is clear that the issue of government access to
electronically generated data, which seemed to be gridlocked by the
fear of terrorism and the partisanship in Washington, has suddenly
taken on new life.
117. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
